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It is well-known that even toddlers are able to manipulate tools in an appropriate
manner according to their physical properties. The ability of children to make novel
tools in order to solve problems is, however, surprisingly limited. In adults, mechanical
problem solving (MPS) has been proposed to be supported by “technical reasoning
skills,” which are thought to be involved in every situation requiring the use of a tool
(whether conventional or unusual). The aim of this study was to investigate the typical
development of real tool use (RTU) skills and its link with technical reasoning abilities in
healthy children. Three experimental tasks were adapted from those used with adults:
MPS (three different apparatus), RTU (10 familiar tool-object pairs), and functional
knowledge (FK; 10 functional picture matching with familiar tools previously used). The
tasks were administered to 85 healthy children divided into six age groups (from 6 to
14 years of age). The results revealed that RTU (p = 0.01) and MPS skills improve with
age, even if this improvement differs according to the apparatus for the latter (p < 0.01
for the Hook task and p < 0.05 for the Sloping task). Results also showed that MPS
is a better predictor of RTU than FK, with a significant and greater weight (importance
weight: 0.65; Estimate ± Standard Error: 0.27 ± 0.08). Ours findings suggest that RTU
and technical reasoning develop jointly in children, independently from development
of FK. In addition, technical reasoning appears partially operative from the age of six
onward, even though the outcome of these skills depends of the context in which they
are applied (i.e., the type of apparatus).
Keywords: tool use, child development, mechanical problem-solving, functional knowledge, school-aged children
INTRODUCTION
Compared to other animal species, tool use is very common in human cultures and one of the
specific features of this behavior is that it evolves in a cumulative manner (Tennie et al., 2009;
Jarry et al., 2016). Innovations are transmitted from one individual to another and from one
generation to the next through social learning (Beck et al., 2012; Osiurak et al., 2016). In this
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regard, from 2 years of age onward, children start to adequately
use tools that they encounter in their environment (i.e.,
conventional tool use; Lockman, 2000; Vaesen, 2012; Cutting
et al., 2014), and this occurs in particular through their abilities
to imitate (i.e., adaptation to social uses). Interestingly, the ability
to solve mechanical problems by using novel tools (e.g., an
unknown apparatus such as the Hook task, see below) may
take place later, at about 8 years of age (Beck et al., 2011).
These findings suggest that real tool use (RTU; e.g., the daily
use of a spoon by a toddler to eat) and mechanical problem
solving (MPS) skills could be based on cognitive mechanisms of
a different nature. This is partly inconsistent with the technical
reasoning hypothesis mainly developed from the study of left
brain-damaged patients, according to which familiar tool use and
MPS should be supported by common cognitive mechanisms
(Le Gall, 1998; Osiurak et al., 2010; Osiurak, 2014; Osiurak and
Badets, 2016). The main goal of the present study is to address this
issue, by exploring how children aged from 6 to 14 years perform
on RTU and MPS tasks.
Development of Tool-Making Abilities in
Childhood
Lockman (2000) proposed that, from a developmental
perspective, the emergence of tool use before 1 year of age
develops in the absence of optimal representational thinking
(i.e., symbolic). Several authors have hence assumed that
human tool use is derived from perceptual-motor behavior
implemented by children at a very young age: exploration of
surfaces/textures/sounds, trial and error strategies, affordance
perception, grip selection, etc. (van Leeuwen et al., 1994;
Kahrs and Lockman, 2014). Recent studies have, however,
reported a striking dissociation between these early skills and
the subsequent emergence of tool-making abilities in children.
Studies have shown on multiple occasions that making a
functional tool independently (i.e., without any demonstration,
called “tool innovation” below) is nearly impossible in healthy
children before the age of 5 years (Beck et al., 2011, 2014; Cutting
et al., 2011) irrespective of their socio-cultural environment
(Nielsen et al., 2014). The task commonly employed consists
in recovering a target that is lodged inside a transparent tube
and that cannot be reached directly by hand (e.g., the Hook
task, Unbending task). The making of a new functional tool,
by modification of available items (for example a hook from
a straight metal rod), does not occur spontaneously until late
in child development: only half of 8-year-old children can do
so (Beck et al., 2011). Furthermore, this ability is subject to
an age effect up to 16–17 years of age. While children aged
4 years are not able to generate a new solution themselves,
they are nonetheless readily able to select a suitable pre-made
tool (for instance a hooked rod versus a straight rod), thus
indicating adequate analysis of the possible use for such tools.
In addition, a prior exploration phase of the tool’s physical
properties (e.g., softness, stiffness and bendability) does not
lead to an improvement in the ability to innovate (Beck et al.,
2011; Gardiner et al., 2012). On the other hand, following a
demonstration by the investigator of how to make a functional
tool (i.e., demonstrated how to bend a rod into a hook), the
children can generally reproduce and use tools from age 3
onward, thereby revealing that they have sufficient dexterity to
solve the problem (Chappell et al., 2013). Thus, the dexterity
is sufficient from age 3, and the selection of a functional tool
seems to occur in children from age 4, for solving a problem
involving tool making (Beck et al., 2014). So, it is not likely that
these factors explain a development of tool innovation abilities
up to 16–17 years of age. In addition, among the children who
can achieve the task, it appears that tool innovation is not the
result of learning by trial and error, since they are able to make it
first-off or after a single unfruitful attempt (Cutting et al., 2011).
Underlying Processes of Tool Innovation
in Children
The previously presented results also revealed different
developmental timetables according to the experimental
conditions that were considered: tool manufacturing (i.e.,
making a functional tool following a demonstration, from age
3 onward) versus tool innovation (i.e., spontaneously making
a functional tool, from age 5 onward), suggesting involvement
of distinct cognitive processes. Limited consideration has been
given, however, to the “innovative” nature of the proposed
apparatus due to the single solution expected by the investigator:
alteration of the available tool with which the children act on the
unknown entities (i.e., the Hook task can only be solved if the
child manufactures a hook). Gardiner et al. (2012) also reported
better abilities among young children (3 years of age) to select
a pre-made functional tool than to use it to solve a mechanical
problem (e.g., extraction of a small stuffed animal from a
transparent box). Unlike the work of Beck and collaborators, in
this study no prior transformation of the material was necessary
to solve the problem. This dissociation is interpreted as a failure
to adequately relate the selected tool with the apparatus, while
affordances of the tool should be adequately apparent, thereby
allowing its selection (Gardiner et al., 2012).
Thus, the question of specificity of the underlying cognitive
processes engaged in these tool innovation tests remains
unanswered. Does the alteration of the material to innovate
a new tool (as in the Hook task) imply the same cognitive
abilities as those engaged in relationships between a pre-made
tool with an apparatus (like in Gardiner’s study)? To answer this
question, it would be relevant to compare the developmental
curves characterizing the performances achieved with familiar
tool use as well as with various types of mechanical apparatus
(for which some require alteration of the material) by the same
sample of children.
Contributions of Studies in Adults
Neuropsychological studies in adults can also shed light on the
understanding of tool innovation in children, notably because
similar experimental devices are commonly employed to assess
tool use skills in patients with apraxia. Specifically, several studies
have shown in left brain-damaged patients a strong association
between conventional tool use (in a prototypical or unusual
manner) and MPS (Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998; Osiurak
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et al., 2009; for review see Osiurak and Badets, 2016; Reynaud
et al., 2016). This has led to the formulation of the hypothesis
that technical reasoning is involved in any tool use, whether
conventional or new/unusual (Le Gall, 1998; Osiurak et al., 2010;
Osiurak, 2014). This cognitive process refers to the capacity to
adapt the purpose of an apparatus (e.g., to punch holes) and
the underlying technical process (e.g., one item less dense than
the other, such as paper sheet/staple). The means and ends are
abstract and relative principles, because they do not correspond
with the physical reality. Rather they are reconstructed de novo
according to each form of use. The same material (e.g., wood) can
provide distinct technical properties (e.g., resilience, opaqueness,
flammability) according to the intended purpose. The same
technical property (e.g., resilience) can also be presented by
different materials (e.g., glass, metal, plastic). In this context,
Jarry et al. (2013, p. 2323) assumed that the inability to use tools
could reflect difficulties regarding differentiating and relating
relevant technical means (e.g., dense, permeable, resilient, etc.),
for a given outcome (e.g., cutting, etching, etc.). For example,
“the lead of a pencil is brittle when applied to paper, but not to
leather.”
It has also been established that knowledge of prototypical
tool use (semantic memory) is involved in tool use, particularly
for adaptation to social uses (e.g., to use scissors “like everyone
else”; Vaesen, 2012; see also Defeyter and German, 2003 for the
concept of “functional fixedness” in children). Yet, while this
functional knowledge (FK) might be useful for conventional tools
use (i.e., for which prior use has occurred), it is not necessary for
intrinsic use and does not suffice to account for everyday uses,
which generally require uncommon procedures and the use of
non-familiar tools (see also Vaesen, 2012). Baumard et al. (2014)
pointed out that apraxic patients exhibiting impairments of
technical reasoning (e.g., on a sequential MPS test) systematically
have pronounced difficulties using tools in a conventional way.
Although this conclusion was drawn from adults, it stresses that
the cognitive processes involved in solving mechanical problems,
also participate in effective use of tools in other contexts.
Overview of the Present Study
The aim of our study was to explore the developmental link
between RTU and MPS skills in healthy children. As suggested,
children could be able to use tools in a conventional way before
developing considerable MPS skills. This is partly inconsistent
with the neuropsychological literature, which mentions a strong
link between these two aspects. Three different apparatus were
used for the assessment of MPS skills, because the success
rates in children for these tasks can differ according to the
transparency mechanical relationships and the required degree of
tool manipulation (Gardiner et al., 2012). So, at a theoretical level,
it appears fundamental to understand how the different forms
of tool use skills evolve with age. From a clinical perspective,
this is also a fundamental question, since impairment of tool
use is frequently described in various etiological contexts with
children, such as developmental coordination disorders, cerebral
palsy, premature birth, autism (O’Hare et al., 1999; Wunsch
et al., 2013; Geldof et al., 2016). Yet the cognitive processes that
underlie these impairments are rarely analyzed, due to a lack of
available assessment tests in particular. Besides, children were
also assessed on a task assessing FK, notably because it has been
suggested that this knowledge could be the support for familiar
tool use (Vaesen, 2012). Our study focused on children aged
from 6 to 14 years, a period in which significant age effects on
tool innovation have been noted in previous research, with the
emergence of alternative problem-solving strategies from the age
of 8 years old (Beck et al., 2011). To our knowledge, no study has
investigated normal childhood developmental curves up to the
age of 14 for these tests.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Following formal approval of the study protocol by the School
Inspection Services, a volunteer cohort of 85 children aged 6 up
to and including 14 years of age was recruited between January
2014 and June 2015 from the French school system (from first
grade to third grade). Once permission was obtained from the
school principal and the teachers, all of the children in the
class were given the option to participate in the study, provided
that the children did not exhibit any of the exclusion criteria:
sensory impairments (visual or auditory), their proficiency with
the French language was insufficient to allow them to perform the
tests, neurodevelopmental or psychiatric pathologies, suspected
or proven learning disorders, premature birth (prior to 37 weeks
of gestation), or lack of parental consent. The total sample (mean
age of 10 years and 3 months, SD: 2 years and 5 months) was
divided into six experimental groups according to their ages: 6–
7 year olds, 8 year olds, 9 year olds, 10 year olds, 11–12 year olds,
and 13–14 year olds.
Materials
The assessment of effective tool use (conventional or new) was
performed using tests developed for a population of adults with
cerebral lesions (Jarry et al., 2013; Lesourd et al., 2016), adapted
in the present study for use with children.
Real Tool Use (RTU)
For this tool use test, the apparatus was comprised of 11 familiar
tools displayed simultaneously on a vertical board (see Figure 1).
The corresponding objects with which the tools could be used
were arranged one by one on a table between the child and the
vertical board.
Each child was asked to select the tool corresponding with the
object presented, and to perform the usual action carried out with
the displayed tools and objects. The pair jug/glass was used as a
practice item (i.e., assistance with the selection and performance
of the action, if necessary) during which the examiner stressed
to the children that they needed to fully perform the actions.
Performance was video-taped, and one point was awarded if the
child exhibited correct use of the object with the appropriate tool
within the time limit (i.e., 1 min for each item). No point was
awarded if the action was not successfully carried out, according
to efficiency criteria defined beforehand (e.g., the position of the
dead bolt changed due to the action of the key in the lock, the
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FIGURE 1 | The real tool use test. The left picture represents the vertical “tool panel” used for the presentation of the tools (a, jug; b, light bulb; c, bottle cap
opener; d, key; e, screwdriver; f, piece of chalk; g, electrical plug; h, plastic sleeve; i, hammer; j, lead pencil; k, scissors). The right picture show examples of tools
and the corresponding objects upon which they can be used (i.e., glass, desk lamp, capped glass bottle, lock on a wooden board, screw in a wooden board, slate,
electrical socket, ringbinder, nail in a wooden board, pencil sharpener, coil of hemp yarn, respectively).
FIGURE 2 | Apparatus and rods used in the mechanical problem solving tasks. The black circles denote the wooden targets that the children had to extract
from the boxes (derived from Lesourd et al., 2016). (A) The displayed rods; (B) the Chimney task; (C) the Hook task; (D) the Sloping task.
pencil was sharpened by the pencil sharpener and wood shavings
were generated). The maximum possible score was 10 points.
Mechanical Problem-Solving (MPS)
For this test, we used three different transparent plastic apparatus,
as Lesourd et al. (2016), albeit with multiple choices. The aim
of this test was to extract a little red wooden cube or bead
(i.e., the targets), which were lodged inside each of the boxes.
For each apparatus, the Chimney task (Figure 2B), the Hook
task (Figure 2C), and the Sloping task (Figure 2D) required
different actions in order to solve the problem (for more details
see Lesourd et al., 2016). To do so, the children were provided
with the following materials (Figure 2A): four 25 cm rods (one
was made of wood and the others were either aluminum, copper,
or tin) and four 7 cm rods (made of the same physical material).
The rods were displayed simultaneously in a row on a table to
the right of the subjects. The rods hence had various physical
properties, e.g., half were long (i.e., rods A, C, E, and G, as shown
in Figure 2A) and half were short (i.e., rods B, D, F, and H), half
were rigid (i.e., rods A, B, C, and D) and half were flexible (i.e.,
rods E, F, G, and H).
The participants could perform this test using one or both
hands, but the problem could not be solved by directly inserting
a hand into the box, by shaking or other physical handling, by
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trial and error, or by choosing the rods at random. A sequence
comprised of two actions was necessary to solve the problem.
Children could use several rods to extract the target (i.e.,
combining several rods or alternating different rods according to
the target’s movement in the box), but only two rods were relevant
and necessary to solve each problem (see Lesourd et al., 2016
for more details). Before the test, a sample test was performed
(i.e., assistance with performing the action, if necessary) so as to
ensure that the children had identified the target that needed to
be extracted and had adequately understood the aim of the test.
The test item consisted of a red wooden bead that needed to be
extracted from a rectangular and horizontal tube by pushing it
with a wooden rod. The only instruction that was given with the
example was: “using the items at your disposal, show me how to
recover the target that is lodged in this box. You may turn the
box but do not lift it up.” No feedback was given but children
were given neutral prompts if required: “keep going, there is a
solution.” Performance was video-taped, and the time limit was
3 min for each item. Two variables were collected for this test:
a qualitative score in terms of success/failure (“Beck’s rating”)
and a quantitatively accurate score based on a 4-point scale (see
Table 1), which was quite similar to the one used by Jarry et al.
(2013). The maximum score was 3 points for each apparatus.
Functional Knowledge (FK)
Four images with different single familiar tools were displayed
below the picture of a tool target (target stimuli were the same as
those used in the RTU test). The children were asked to choose
one of the four response options as the best match for the target,
by pointing to it. The test was preceded by one practice trial (with
a jug) for which feedback regarding the correctness was given.
The target and the correct response were functionally equivalent
(e.g., electrical plug and candle). A score of 1 point was awarded
if the correct response was given within 20 s, equating with a total
possible score of 10 points.
Procedure
When possible, children were tested at their school (in a quiet
room), or at home (in an isolated room, without the parents being
present). The tests were systematically administered in a specific
ordered manner for each participant: RTU test first, then MPS
tasks and finally FK test. This work was included in a broader
study regarding gestural development and tool use in children.
An anamnestic questionnaire completed by the parents allowed
for confirmation prior to the assessment that the criteria for
inclusion/exclusion in the study were adhered to. An informed
consent form (authorizing the video recordings) was signed by
a legal representative for each child, specifying their freedom to
withdraw from the study without any prejudice. The rationale
and design of the study were detailed in an information pamphlet.
The research was conducted in accordance with the University
guidelines and the ethical standards established by the Helsinki
Declaration.
Data Analysis
Preliminary statistical analyses were conducted with variance
analysis (ANOVAs, Bonferroni post hoc) and the Chi-Square test
was used to examine the equivalence of the age groups in terms
of gender, the parents’ level of education, and laterality. The
inspection of MPS, RTU, and FK score distributions revealed that
none of them met the conditions for application of parametric
tests: non-normal distribution of raw scores (Kolmogorov–
Smirnov one-sample test) and non-homogeneity of variances
(Levene’s test). Consequently, Kruskal–Wallis ANOVAs were
used to examine the effect of the main factor, namely age (six
attributes: 6–7 years of age, 8 years of age, 9 years of age,
10 years of age, 11–12 years of age, 13–14 years of age), on
MPS performances (three apparatus raw scores), RTU and FK
results. Post hoc contrasts were computed with Mann–Whitney
tests. Friedman ANOVAs were used to examine the effect of
the apparatus (different types of boxes) according to age, with
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests used for within-group comparisons
according to age. Spearman rank correlations were used to study
relationships between Age, RTU, MPS, and FK on the whole
group (n = 85). However, to better examine the influence of
MPS and FK on RTU, we used a generalized linear mixed model
(GLMM; Burnham et al., 2011), which included MPS and FK
as fixed factors, and Age as arandom factor. This analysis was
conducted on the whole group (n = 85). For this analysis,
RTU scores were converted into binomial scores (10: Success;
<10: Failure). Akaike’s Information Criterion value corrected
for small sample size (AICc) was calculated for the GLMM.
TABLE 1 | Accuracy-based scoring system used for mechanical problem solving tasks.
3 points 2 points 1 point 0 point
The Chimney task The target had fallen down but was
not extracted from the box
The child touched the target with a
rod but without causing it to fall
down
The Hook task
The target was extracted from
the box within the time limit,
independently of the rod that
was used
The target was fully taken off the
base but it was not extracted from
the box
The child touched the target with a
rod but the target was never
completely taken off the base
The children touched
the box but never the target
The Sloping task The target was wedged near the
opening due to the action of a rod
but it was not extracted from the
box
The child touched the outer part of
the bottom of the seesaw with a
rod introduced into the round
opening but they did not activate
the seesaw
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TABLE 2 | General data related to the different age groups of the sample.
6–7 years (n = 17) 8 years (n = 12) 9 years (n = 10) 10 years (n = 15) 11–12 years (n = 16) 13–14 years (n = 15)
Age (months) 84.94 (6.92) 101.67 (2.49) 110.80 (3.66) 126.07 (3.60) 145.31 (8.22) 167.13 (4.56)
Girls/boys (n) 8/9 8/4 8/2 10/5 8/8 7/8
Edinburgh (quotient of laterality) 81.18 (41.00) 65.00 (54.70) 71.50 (28.46) 82.67 (46.69) 60.63 (53.67) 64.67 (60.54)
PEL (in years) 15.21 (2.88) 16.00 (3.87) 14.15 (2.75)a 12.43 (2.04)a 12.34 (2.30)a 13.10 (3.02)
All scores correspond to mean scores (with standard deviations in parentheses). PEL, Parental Education Level (mean for both parents). aFor one child the PEL was
calculated based on the level of education for only one of their parents.
FIGURE 3 | Developmental course of MPS, RTU, and FK tests (n = 85). Percentage successful score accuracy-based scoring system for the three MPS tasks.
Models were ranked in relation to each other using1AICc values
[1i=AICc(i) – AICc(min)]. Akaike weights were computed (ωi)
to assess the likelihood of the model relative to the other models
considered. All models were averaged to calculate predictor
estimates and standard errors using full-model averaging method
(Burnham et al., 2011). The GLMM analyses and the model-
averaged coefficients were respectively computed using the lme4
and MuMIn packages in R 3.1.3. For all analyses, the alpha
threshold was fixed at p < 0.05. The effect sizes were calculated
with Cohen’s d, considering the effect as being large from 0.8 and
as being medium from 0.5 (Cohen, 1988).
RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
Sociodemographic characteristics of the sample are presented
in Table 2. The age groups were comparable in terms of
laterality, according to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
(Oldfield, 1971; with values between +100 for extreme right
hand preference and −100), F(5,79) = 0.502, NS, and sex ratios,
χ2(6) = 6.191, NS, although there was a significant difference in
terms of the parental level of education, F(5,79)= 3.766, p< 0.01.
Bonferroni’s post hoc test showed that the parental education level
was significantly higher for the 8 year old children than for the 10
and 11–12 years old children. However, no significant correlation
was found between the parental education level and scores for
the MPS (all r < −0.10, NS), RTU (r = 0.03, NS), or the FK
(r = −0.10, NS) test. We hence did not take this variable into
account for the statistical analyses.
Similarly, gender had no effect on the children’s performances
on the MPS, RTU, and FK tests (Mann–Whitney tests, data not
shown). Thus, data from boys and girls were combined for further
analyses.
Age Effect
An effect of age was observed on the RTU test, H(5,85)= 14.618,
p = 0.01. Post hoc tests were computed and showed that only the
youngest children performed worse than children aged 8, 11–12,
and 13–14 years of age, with large effect sizes (Cohen’s d between
0.87 and 1.30). Furthermore, the successful scores increased with
age for the FK, although only a tendency toward significance
(p = 0.054) was found between the age groups. These results are
illustrated by the developmental curves shown in Figure 3.
We compared the qualitative performances (“Beck’s rating”)
for the various age groups with the three apparatus for the
MPS task using Chi-Square tests. There was a trend for the
performance on the Chimney task to improve with age (only 59%
of children succeeded at 6–7 years of age, while 94% succeeded
at 11–12 years of age), although only two significant differences
emerged (see Figure 4): more of the 11–12 year-old children
succeed than the 6–7 and the 8 year olds (χ2 = 5.470, p = 0.02;
χ2 = 5.110, p = 0.02, respectively). A greater progression was
found with the Hook task: the 11–12 and the 13–14 year-old
children were better than the younger 6–7, 8, and 10 year-old (all
ps< 0.03). Likewise, on the Sloping task, the 10–14 year olds were
better than the 6–7 and 9 year olds (all ps< 0.03). The number of
children who succeeded at this task was also significantly higher
among the 13–14 year-old relative to the group of 8 year olds
(χ2 = 6.240, p= 0.01).
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FIGURE 4 | Dichotomous scores of children according to age for the MPS tasks (Beck’s rating).
TABLE 3 | Mechanical problem solving, real tool use, and functional knowledge accuracy-based scores system according to the age group.
Chimney task Hook task Sloping task Real tool use Functional
knowledge
6–7 years
(G1, n = 17)
2.4 (0.9) 2.1 (1.1) 1.0 (1.1) 8.3 (1.4) 6.6 (1.2)
8 years
(G2, n = 12)
2.5 (0.7) 2.5 (0.9) 1.7 (0.9) 9.6 (0.7) 6.8 (1.7)
9 years
(G3, n = 10)
2.6 (1.0) 2.6 (0.8) 1.1 (0.7) 9.3 (0.9) 7.1 (1.1)
10 years
(G4, n = 15)
2.8 (0.4) 2.5 (0.9) 1.7 (1.4) 9.1 (0.8) 7.6 (1.4)
11–12 years
(G5, n = 16)
2.9 (0.3) 3.0 (0.0) 2.1 (1.0) 9.4 (1.1) 7.7 (1.3)
13–14 years
(G6, n = 15)
2.9 (0.4) 3.0 (0.0) 2.3 (1.2) 9.7 (0.6) 7.9 (1.1)
Main effect
(H, Kruskal–Wallis)
9.066 15.683∗∗ 14.583∗ 14.618∗ 10.882
Groups comparison (U, Mann–Whitney)
with Effect size (Cohen’s d)
– G1 < G5∗∗, G6∗∗
(d = 1.16)
G2 < G5∗, G6∗
(d = 0.79)
G4 < G5∗, G6∗
(d = 0.79)
G1 < G2∗, G5∗∗, G6∗∗
(d = 0.70)
(d = 1.05)
(d = 1.13)
G3 < G5∗, G6∗
(d = 1.16)
(d = 1.22)
G1 < G2∗∗, G5∗, G6∗∗
(d = 1.17)
(d = 0.87)
(d = 1.30)
–
All scores correspond to mean scores (with standard deviations in parentheses). G1, Group 1; G2, Group 2; G3, Group 3; G4, Group 4; G5, Group 5; G6, Group 6.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001. The effect sizes were calculated with Cohen’s d, considering the effect as large from 0.8 and as medium from 0.5
Results for the accuracy-based scoring system in the MPS
tasks (4-point scale) are presented in Table 3. Kruskall-Wallis
ANOVAs revealed a main effect of age on two of the three
apparatus for the MPS test: the Hook task, H(5,85) = 15.683,
p< 0.01, and the Sloping task, H(5,85)= 14.583, p< 0.05. There
was no effect of age on the quantitative scores for the Chimney
task, H(5,85)= 9.066, NS. For the Hook task, the post hoc analyses
showed that the maximal successful performance was reached
from 11 years of age onward, which is significantly distinct from
the performances of the 6–7, 8, and 10-year-old, with large effect
sizes (Cohen’s d between 0.79 and 1.16). For the Sloping task,
comparisons between age groups indicate that the 6–7 and the
9 year olds children performed worse than children aged 11–
12 and 13–14 (Cohen’s d between 1.05 and 1.22). Additionally,
the youngest children (6–7 year-old) performed worse than
children aged 8 years on this apparatus, with a medium effect size
(d = 0.70).
Relationships between RTU, MPS, and
FK
The correlations between scores for the MPS, FK, and RTU tests
are presented in Table 4.
When the different age groups were pooled together (i.e.,
n = 85), three significant correlations were seen between age
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TABLE 4 | Correlations according to whole sample (n = 85) between real
tool use, mechanical problem-solving and functional knowledge.
Age Real tool use Mechanical
problem solving
Real tool use 0.30∗∗
Mechanical problem solving 0.52∗∗∗ 0.21∗
Functional knowledge 0.39∗∗∗ 0.05 0.14
Spearman correlation coefficients. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
TABLE 5 | Influence of MPS and FK on RTU (GLMM analysis).
Models k AICc 1i ωi
MPS 3 118.67 0.00 0.47
Intercept 2 119.86 1.19 0.26
MPS + FK 4 120.64 1.97 0.18
FK 3 121.93 3.27 0.09
k, number of parameters in the model; AICc, Akaike’s information criterion
corrected; 1i, AICc(i) – AICc(min); ωi, Akaike weights explaining total variance.
Models with 1i < 2 are in italics.
and RTU/MPS/FK (all ps < 0.01). In addition, a significant
correlation was also seen between RTU and MPS (r = 0.21;
p = 0.049). Nonetheless, no significant correlation was found
between scores for RTU and FK, or between MPS and
FK.
As mentioned, the influence of the predictors MPS and FK
on RTU was tested using a generalized linear mixed model
(GLMM) with Age as a random factor. There were three
top candidate models with 1i < 2 (see Table 5), the best
one being the MPS only model. We also computed model-
averaged estimators based on AICc. The only statistically
significant predictor of RTU is MPS (Importance weight: 0.65;
Estimate ± Standard Error: 0.27 ± 0.08). This variable was
significant at the 95% confidence level (the interval did not
contain the 0 value).
Apparatus Effect on Mechanical Problem
Solving
Friedman ANOVAs revealed an effect of the apparatus on the
MPS tasks at 6–7 years of age (χ2 = 16.511, p< 0.001), 9 years of
age (χ2 = 10.571, p < 0.01), 11–12 years of age (χ2 = 10.750,
p < 0.01) and 13–14 years of age (χ2 = 7.429, p < 0.05).
A significant trend was only seen at 8 years of age (χ2 = 5.892,
p = 0.05), and there were no significant differences between the
three apparatus at 10 years of age (χ2 = 2.722, p= NS).
Post hoc intra-group age comparisons showed that the
Sloping task was accomplished significantly worse than the two
apparatus of the MPS test by 6–7-year-old than 11–12-year-
old (p-values < 0.05). For the oldest children (13–14 years
of age), the scores for the Sloping task were not significantly
different from the other apparatus (p = 0.07). By contrast,
the successful performances with the other two apparatus
(Chimney task and Hook task) were equivalent for the six age
groups.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to explore the typical
development of RTU and its relationship with MPS in a sample
of school-age children. The novelty of this work lies in the use
of a new experimental test to evaluate RTU in everyday-life,
associated in the use of three different MPS tasks (Chimney,
Hook, and Sloping tasks). In addition, FK was also assessed, with
strictly matched items (the same tools were used in the two tasks).
The main finding is a significant developmental progression
of scores in children between 6 and 14 years on the RTU test and
on the MPS tasks with two apparatus, namely the Hook task and
the Sloping task. However, we found only a weak improvement
with age for the FK test. Interestingly, MPS appears to be a better
predictor of RTU task than FK. Finally, we found no association
between the RTU test and FK.
Underlying Cognitive Processes Involved
in the Development of Real Tool Use
We found a significant link between the age of children and the
three types of tests proposed in this study: RTU, MPS, and FK.
The analysis of relationships between these different forms of tool
use abilities revealed in healthy children an interesting and novel
involvement of MPS skills in conventional tool use development.
More particularly, GLMM analyses revealed that MPS was a good
predictor of RTU even when age is included as a random factor.
In broad terms, a link between MPS and RTU exists between
6 and 14 years of age. This link supports the hypothesis that
the analysis of technical apparatus properties contributes to the
development of RTU, independently of age and FK. Along these
lines, Gergely and Csibra (2003; and more recently Hernik and
Csibra, 2015) developed the notion of a teleogical interpretation
system (“teleological stance”) that allows children from age one
onward to observe actions and to conjure inferences linking these
actions in terms of means and ends as a function of situational
constraints. In addition, Hernik and Csibra (2009) point out that
an object is always made for something, even if not used. The
behavior of even very young children shows this search for an
object-function association, providing knowledge on the use and
function of objects and allowing the child to learn by observing
others.
Regarding the FK test, no developmental effect was found,
and the GLMM analysis revealed that FK does not predict RTU.
Overall, these results indicate that children possess the majority
of FK on these tools from 6 years of age onward. In our study,
this knowledge does not contribute to the typical development
of the abilities for effective use of these same tools between 6
and 14 years of age. This supports the hypothesis that FK is not
necessary for and evolves in parallel to RTU in everyday life.
The lack of assoiation between the RTU and FK tests puts the
nature of the knowledge examined in question. As a matter of
fact, those semantic knowledges allow the selection of the tool
that is typically used with a given object. On the other hand, it
is unlikely that FK allows for effective and efficient use of the
tool in question. More particularly, FK can be used to select a
bottle opener as the tool usually used to remove the cap from a
glass bottle. Nonetheless, this knowledge does not provide the
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information required to use the tool efficiently (i.e., which part
of the tool must be applied to the bottle, what action must
be undertaken: lifting, rubbing, turning, etc.). In other words,
semantic FK might not be critical for effective use but could
facilitate the process to a certain extent (see Hodges et al., 2000;
Bozeat et al., 2002). Specific knowledge regarding “use” could be
reflected in the “mechanical” properties of the tools (i.e., the way
of learning about the tools and the relationship with their abstract
physical properties like rigidity, flexibility, etc.).
Age Effect on Mechanical Problem
Solving Depends on the Type of
Experimental Apparatus
Our results reveal an effect of age on the performance of the
MPS task, particularly for two out of the three apparatus (Sloping
and Chimney apparatus) irrespective of the rating method used
(i.e., Beck’s rating system or the accuracy-based scoring system
created for our study) in agreement with previous study (Beck
et al., 2011; Cutting et al., 2011). For the Hook task, our findings
show a ceiling effect from 11 years of age onward instead of
16–17 years of age, which could indicate earlier maturity of the
underlying processes than in the data of Beck et al. (2011). Several
methodological variations could explain these differences (e.g.,
the time limit, the number of tools). The progression appeared
more linear for the Sloping task, with medium to large effect
sizes. Performance appeared equivalent between children of 6–
7 years of age and 9 years of age (score of 1.1 points out of 3),
and an extended improvement of the scores up to 14 years of
age was seen (2.3 points, on average, out of 3). By contrast, no
significant developmental effect is observed on the Chimney task
for the age groups between 6 and 14 years of age. So, the type
of experimental apparatus modifies age effects on MPS: mature
performance at 6 years of age for the Chimney task, at 11 years
of age for the Hook task, or under development at 14 years of
age for the Sloping task. Moreover, the details of the accuracy-
based scoring system on the Hook task show that from 6 years
of age, children get a mean score of 2.1 points out of 3. These
results indicate that those who failed to extract the target from the
box in the allocated time (47% of the children) were nonetheless
able to raise the target off the bottom of the tube. So the analysis
of the technical properties of the apparatus already seems to
be taking place at the cognitive level. For instance, use of a
sufficiently long tool allows contact and action on the target at
the bottom of the box (see Figures 2A,C). The hypothesis of an
early engagement of technical reasoning from age of 6 onward
that allows mechanical problems to be solved, nevertheless raises
the issue of the cognitive processes explaining the improvement
of scores after this age in the MPS tasks.
The two apparatus showing age effects in our sample revealed
differential growth curves. In fact, the intra-group analyses
revealed a significant effect of the type of apparatus between 6
and 14 years of age. The Sloping task is the only apparatus with
considerably less success than the other two up to 11–12 years
of age, after which the gap tended to narrow with the older
children (13–14 years of age). A partial variation of the scores
for solving mechanical problems was hence seen, depending on
the different relationships of means-end reciprocity engaged as
a function of age: directly reach and move the target for the
Chimney task, create a new tool for the Hook task, and carefully
explore the apparatus to find the seesaw for the Sloping task.
So this partial effect of apparatus that do not share the same
technical principles suggests that technical analysis is done in the
here and now. This is consistent with the results of Beck et al.
(2014), who reported no transfer of knowledge for the Hook
task with different means and materials. Another explanation
could be that there is an effect of complexity between the
different mechanical problems used, since performance in the
Sloping task is clearly inferior to that obtained in the other
apparatus, whatever the age group. Such an effect of complexity
has already been seen among healthy children of pre-school age
in the setting of MPS. Thus, Gardiner et al. (2012) revealed a
significant difference between the success rates with three types of
mechanical problems according to the transparency mechanical
relationships between objects present in the apparatus and the
degree of tool manipulation required to extract the target from
the box. Unlike other apparatus, the Sloping task in our study
requires finding the mobile compartment enclosed within the
box, so the affordances of this task were partially hidden. The
low scores observed in the Sloping task probably reflect the
children’s difficulty to readily separate the observable properties
of the material so as to discover access to the seesaw located at
the back of the box (see Figure 2D). So, this particular apparatus
could be more subject than the others to the ability to block
non-pertinent strategies; namely, to switch and approach the
problem from another point of view, and to plan the successive
stages required to solve the problem; or, in other words, through
use of executive functioning. Given that cognitive processes are
also in full development but still relatively immature at the ages
covered in our study (Roy, 2015), their contribution could prove
to be effective only in older children. This could potentially
explain the narrowing of the significant gap between the scores
for the Sloping task and the two other mechanical problems with
increasing age.
Further research is needed to highlight the nature of the
strategies used by children to solve the MPS task. A first step
in this direction was through our study with an accuracy-based
scoring system, but qualitative analyses based on the tool selection
(number of relevant and irrelevant tools grasped; see Lesourd
et al., 2016) versus their application are also required. Such
measurements would allow for examination of the capacity of
children to recognize the technical means suitable for performing
the task (rigid, flexible, sufficiently long, etc.) and not only the
adequate form of a preformed tool. The time spent engaged in
various actions could also be studied (no handling, tool handling,
box handling, tool-box manipulation; see Osiurak et al., 2013)
so as to distinguish behaviors exploring the boxes or the tools
as separate from genuine attempts at relating to the purpose
of the apparatus (extracting the target) through the technical
application of the tools. Other studies are also required to explore
possible links between MPS and executive functioning in healthy
children. While previous works have already raised this issue
(Chappell et al., 2013), to our knowledge, no prior study has
employed executive tests to address this hypothesis.
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CONCLUSION
To conclude, this study is original in examining the typical
development of RTU and its relationships with MPS. We found
an effect of age between 6 and 14 years on the RTU test and
on the MPS tasks with only two apparatus. Our findings also
provide evidence for the existence of relationships between the
real use of tools and MPS, and the joint development of these
skills in children. On the other hand, no developmental effect
was found for FK test in relation to these tools. Thus, the absence
of a relationship with conventional tool use suggests that RTU
and FK could evolve in parallel without a strong connection.
Furthermore, our results suggest that the underlying processes
of technical reasoning (specifying the relationships between
various environmental components) are partially operative from
the age of 6 onward, even though the outcome of their use
varies according to the context in which they are applied.
Lastly, while the theoretical framework used in this study is
based on work developed using adults, it offers interesting
perspectives in regard to understanding the development of
abilities of tool use in various contexts in children. The
relationships between RTU and MPS remain to be explored in
the context of pediatric pathologies, thus potentially allowing
the underlying cognitive processes to be dissociated. Studies
of children with Developmental Coordination Disorder (DCD)
would be particularly relevant, as they experience difficulties with
the use of tools in everyday life.
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